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APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO, PRESIDING 
JOHN L. McCOY 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
310 S. Main Street, Suite 1309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ROYAL K. HUNT 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
1871 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
AUG T i $3 
to 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. No c i t a t i o n s to the record are made in a p p e l l a n t f s 
( p l a i n t i f f ' s ) b r i e f to suppor t a p p e l l a n t ' s con t en t i on t h a t the 
p r o v i s i o n s of an addendum proposed by p l a i n t i f f was made a 
cond i t i on of performance by p l a i n t i f f , thus t h i s Court cannot 
consider such a contention. 
2. Appellant c i t e s no applicable case showing tha t the 
t r i a l Court committed e r r o r in any i n s t r u c t i o n s given to the 
j u r y . The i n s t r u c t i o n s quoted in a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f merely s e t 
forth respondent 's contentions and theory of the case to the jury 
and those c o n t e n t i o n s and t h e o r i e s are suppor ted by i s s u e s in 
t h e p l e a d i n g s and s u b s t a n t i a l t e s t i m o n y . No p r o p o s e d 
i n s t r u c t i o n s were submi t t ed by the p l a i n t i f f a t t r i a l ; thus he 
has waived any object ions tha t his contentions were not presented 
to the jury; fu r ther , appel lant does not argue on appeal any of 
the o b j e c t i o n s to i n s t r u c t i o n s made a t t r i a l . Objec t ions 
raised for the f i r s t time on appeal cannot be considered. 
3. There i s no a rguab le b a s i s in f a c t or law for t h i s 
appeal, thus the decision of the t r i a l . Court should be affirmed 
and th i s case remanded for determination of a t torney ' s fees. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. No citations to the record are made in appellant's 
(plaintiff's) brief to support appellant's contention that the 
provisions of an addendum proposed by plaintiff was made a 
condition of performance by plaintiff, thus this Court cannot 
consider such a contention. 
2. Appellant cites no applicable case showing that the 
trial Court committed error in any instructions given to the 
jury. The instructions quoted in appellant's brief merely set 
forth respondent's contentions and theory of the case to the jury 
and those contentions and theories are supported by issues in 
the pleadings and substantial testimony. No proposed 
instructions were submitted by the plaintiff at trial; thus he 
has waived any objections that his contentions were not presented 
to the jury; further, appellant does not argue on appeal any of 
the objections to instructions made at trial. Objections 
raised for the first time on appeal cannot be considered. 
3. There is no arguable basis in fact or law for this 
appeal, thus the decision of the trial Court should be affirmed 
and this case remanded for determination of attorney's fees. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRAD M. BIRD d/b/a CBS Interior, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
DUANE H. LINFORD and STANLEY E. 
VARNER, individually and as 
partners d/b/a under the firm 
name and style of Goldstone 
Investment/ 
Defendants-Respondents.) 
Case No. 870438 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
P l a i n t i f f h a s t i m e l y a p p e a l e d a f i n a l o r d e r of t h e 
t r i a l C o u r t b a s e d u p o n s p e c i a l i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s of a j u r y 
d i s m i s s i n g h i s c o m p l a i n t w i t h p r e j u d i c e . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether t h e t r i a l Cour t c o m m i t t e d p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r 
i n i t s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y . 
2 . W h e t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f w a i v e d a n y d e f e c t i n 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
3 . Whether o r no t t h i s a p p e a l i s f r i v o l o u s . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The c o m p l a i n t of t h e p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e d t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t c o n t r a c t e d and a g r e e d i n w r i t i n g f o r t h e 
p l a i n t i f f t o f u r n i s h a n d i n s t a l l i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s a l l f l o o r c o v e r i n g s upon a b u i l d i n g p r o j e c t owned 
by t h e d e f e n d a n t s . 
2 
This allegation was denied by defendants answer, 
(Record, p. 8) which also alleged among other defenses that any 
alleged agreement was delivered in error, or substantially 
amended by plaintiff, and as a result, the defendants refused to 
allow the plaintiff to perform.. 
After a plenary trial, the jury answered special 
interrogatories in which the jury found that an addendum was 
attached to the plaintiff's contract when he signed it, but not 
attached to defendants copy of the contract when they signed it. 
The jury further found that the plaintiff had not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he had made a clear, positive 
and unambiguous acceptance of the contract prepared by defendants 
and found that the plaintiff had attempted to change, add to or 
qualify the terms of the original contract form prepared by 
defendants. 
Based upon those answers, the Court entered an order 
dismissing the action with prejudice because the findings of the 
jury showed no contract was agreed upon between the parties. 
The evidence at trial relevant to the issues in this 
appeal was as follows (all page reference are to the trial tran-
script unless otherwise designated): 
Stan Varner, one of the defendants, testified that his 
duties were to serve as a construction manager on the site. He 
oversaw all the construction details and was in charge of 
3 
preparing purchase orders and signing contracts for the company. 
(P. 151.) 
Gayla Allen, a secretary in the office of defendants 
testified at page 126, lines 22-23 that plaintiff had come in and 
taken an unsigned copy of the proposed contract with him. She 
had two (2) contract forms, Exhibit 2P, which had been signed by 
Stan Varner, but were unsigned by plaintiff, in her file. (Page 
127, Lines 16-23). A few days after plaintiff took the unsigned 
copy, he came back to the office, Gayla Allen took out the two 
(2) originals that the defendant had signed and she had the 
plaintiff sign them. (Page 127, lines 12-25). It was at that 
time the plaintiff gave Ms. Allen the addendum that has been 
marked as Exhibit 10D. (P. 128, Lines 1-22), and it was at this 
time that Mr. Bird said "This (meaning Exhibit 10D) went with the 
contract", and then Mr. Bird left. (P. 128, lines 7-23). This 
testimony was confirmed by Joan Varner, another secretary. (P. 
143-144) Ms. Allen showed the defendant, Stan Varner, the 
addendum, Exhibit 10D, when he returned to the office. (P. 129, 
lines 1-6). 
The plaintiff, according to his own testimony at 
trial, took the position that Exhibit 10D, the addendum was in 
fact attached to Exhibit 2P, the contract at the time that it was 
signed. Further, he had taken the position from the time that 
Exhibit 2P was signed that the addendum (Exhibit 10D) was a part 
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of the contract and sQ testified at his deposition. (P. 101-
103). 
Further/ during pre-trial discovery, said amendment was 
produced by the plaintiff as being a part of the contract/ 
(Transcript page 103/ Lines 9-14). The plaintiff took the 
position that from the time that 2P was signed that the addendum. 
Exhibit 10D was in fact a part of that contract. (Transcript 103f 
Line 17-21). 
Exhibit 10D changed the brand of carpet and the 
schedule of payments from the provisions of Exhibit 2P. Mr. 
Bird later talked with Mr. Varner about the change in the brand 
of carpet after the signing of Exhibit P2 (page 104/ Lines 22-
25). Further, the plaintiff/ Mr. Bird/ admitted that the brand 
of carpet provided by Exhibit 10D did not have a published fire 
rating. (Page 107/ lines 18-25). 
Exhibit 10P/ which Mr. Bird attempted to have 
made a part of the contract/ provided as follows: 
"Payments on materials are to be for the full 
amount of the invoice for materials stored either 
on the job site or in an approved warehouse. 
Subcontractor will invoice within two days of 
delivery from supplier. Payment in full to be 
niade to the contractor for all~majterials' and 
invoices within 14 days of the invoice dftte."1 
(emphasis added) (Transcript 170). 
Mr. Varner objected to that provision as Mr. Bird was 
trying to get payment for materials within 14 days of the invoice 
date and the original contract only provided for draws every 30 
5 
days and the lender on the p r o j e c t allowed only monthly draws. 
(P. 167-170). 
After Mr. Varner had read over Exhibit 10D, he sent a 
l e t t e r to Mr. Bird, Exhibit 14D and called Brad Bird and told him 
that the types of materials that were indicated were required in 
the contract as opposed to those that were in the amendment were 
unacceptable and Mr. Bird i nd i ca t ed t h a t had he submit ted h i s 
o r i g i n a l bid according to the a c t u a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n s he was 
concerned t h a t he wouldn't have go t ten the bid, a t which t ime, 
Mr. Varner told him that he would be get t ing a l e t t e r terminating 
h i s c o n t r a c t , (P. 174-176). 
Exhibit 16D which is a ce r t i f i ed copy of the Clearfield 
City Ordinances where the apartment complex was to be bu i l t , was 
an enactment of the Uniform Fire Code by Clearfield City. Page 
613-13 thereof requires a l l r e s iden t i a l new apartment houses to 
be a, b or c f i r e r a t i n g . Exhibi t 5P shows paragraphs 21.00 of 
the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s upon the p r o j e c t , which s p e c i f i e s Colonnade 
c a r p e t s , Savoy Sty le #15006. The t h i r d page of t h i s e x h i b i t 
shows the a r c h i t e c t u a l genera l c o n d i t i o n s . Paragraph 1.01 of 
t h a t e x h i b i t r e q u i r e s t h a t a l l work on the p r o j e c t s h a l l be 
performed in s t r i c t conformance to a l l a p p l i c a b l e codes and 
ordinances. 
Mr. Varner asked Mr. Bird for the f i r e r a t i n g on the 
carpeting that was proposed upon Exhibit 10D, but Mr. Bird could 
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never get any fire rating for Mr. Varner. (Transcript 182). 
The plaintiff admitted on cross examination that the 
Bambi carpet in Exhibit 10D did not have a published fire 
rating. (P. 107 lines 23-25). 
The plaintiff did not propose any instructions to the 
Court to be given to the jury. (Record p.30-56). 
The jury answered the Special Interrogatories on 
Exhibit A in the appendix which established that: 
1. That the addendum was attached to the contract upon 
the date that it was signed by the plaintiff, but was not 
attached to the contract when it was signed by defendant. 
2. That the plaintiff did attempt to change, add to or 




THE APPELLANT FAILS TO CITE PAGES 
OF THE RECORD IN HIS BRIEF. 
Rule 24(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
requires that each party make a concise statement of the facts 
and cite the pages in the record where those facts are supported. 
The entire second paragraph of the Statement of the Case by the 
plaintiff-appellant wherein he contends that the addendum was 
not accompanied by an unconditional refusal by plaintiff to 
7 
perform on the underlying contract was not agreed to or accepted 
by defendants and that the defendants refused to allow the 
plaintiff to perform because the addendum constituted a counter-
offer which amounted to a material alteration of the original 
contract is entirely without any citation to in the record. 
This Court need not and will not consider facts not 
properly cited from the pages in the record where those facts are 
established. Dirks v^ Goodwill, 754 P2d 825 (Ct. of App. 1988), 
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 67 Adv. Rep. 15, (Ct. of App. 1987). 
Thus, the above statement of facts or argument thereon cannot be 
considered by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON LAW 
APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS AND LAW OF THIS 
CASE IN EVIDENCE. 
The appellant cites the case of Business Financial 
Services v. Butler £ Booth Development, 147AZ 510, 711 P2d 649 
(1985) for the proposition that: 
"Defendants did not agree to or accept 
plaintiff's proposed amendment but which did 
not give them the right to not perform 
on the underlying contract because the 
proposed amendment was not accompanied 
by plaintiff's unconditional refusal to 
perform on the underlying contract if 
defendants did not accept or agree to the 
amendment." 
T h e
 Butler case decided issues involving assignees, the 
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duty of a subcon t rac to r to supply m a t e r i a l s , the duty of a sub-
c o n t r a c t o r to pay for m a t e r i a l s , r i g h t s of o f f s e t , and j o i n t 
checks. A painstaking reading of th i s case reveals no statement 
which s u p p o r t s t h e above p o s i t i o n of p l a i n t i f f . If t h e 
p l a i n t i f f f e l t t h a t t he re was, in f a c t , a binding c o n t r a c t 
between the p a r t i e s , he should have submitted ins t ruc t ions as to 
such con ten t ions to the Court a t t r i a l , which was not done. 
Failure of the Court to ins t ruc t with respect to the contentions 
of a par ty i s not e r r o r where the pa r ty did not r eques t such 
i n s t r u c t i o n . Will iam v. Denver £ R.G.W.R. Co., 487 P2d 316, 26 
UT 2d 178. 
POINT I I I 
THE APPEAL OF THE PLAINTIFF IS FRIVOLOUS, THUS 
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES REGARDING THIS APPEAL. 
A reading of the record on appeal reveals that the 
plaintiff has contended that the provisions of Exhibit 10D were 
applicable to this transaction both at the time that Exhibit 2D 
was signed, at the taking of his deposition and at the time that 
plaintiff requested that the defendant admit that Exhibit 10D and 
Exhibit 2D were a signed contract. (P. 101-104). The defendants 
steadfastly took the position that if the plaintiff had merely 
signed the form contract, Exhibit 2D without insisting on the 
changes embodied in 10D, that they would have considered Exhibit 
2D a signed contract and given him the authorization to perform. 
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(P. 10). However, because of the insistence of the plaintiff 
that Exhibit 10D was a part of the contract/ the defendants chose 
to regard Exhibit 10D as a counteroffer and refused to allow any 
performance by plaintiff under those conditions. 
At trial, there are numerous statements by counsel for 
plaintiff seeking to avoid the consequences of the plaintiff's 
insistence upon the terms of Exhibit 10D and attempted in every 
way possible to regard Exhibit 2D in of itself as a signed and 
accepted contract between the parties. (P. 416/ L. 1-7/ P. 419-
420). 
It is clear in Utah that a party is entitled to have 
the jury instructed upon his particular theory of the case where 
there is evidence to support it/ even though that theory may be 
different than the theory of the case of another party. 
Goode v. Dayton Disposal/ Inc./ 738 P2d 638 (UT 1987); Watters v. 
Query/ 626 P2d 455/ (UT 1987). 
The plaintiff's own testimony shows clearly that he 
claimed that Exhibit 10D was a part of the contract at the time 
the contract was signed/ at the time the lawsuit was filed/ at 
the time of the taking of his deposition/ and at the time of the 
issuance of request for admissions of fact by him. 
The trial court submitted this matter to a jury upon 
special written interrogatories/ a copy of which are attached 
hereto in the appendix as Exhibit Af which show that the jury 
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found: 
1. That the addendum was attached to the contract upon 
the date that it was signed by the plaintiff, but was not 
attached to the contract when it was signed by defendant. 
2. That the plaintiff did attempt to change, add to or 
qualify the terms of the original contract form prepared by the 
defendant. 
Now on this appeal/ the plaintiff seems to say that 
those instructions were incorrect because they failed to embody 
his theory of this case; yet the plaintiff failed to submit any 
instructions at all in this case. Neither has the plaintiff 
provided this Court with any cases or authorities which say that 
the instructions are in error. The plaintiff's objections to 
instructions 12, 13, 14 and 15 are found in the record at pages 
435 through 439. 
His objection to instruction 12, is as follows: 
"I object to the instruction no. 12 on the basis 
of the fact that if the instruction is to state 
the contentions of the parties, it must be con-
tentions as stated in the pleadings, not as 
stated in the evidence. It's misleading and con-
fusing in syntax, gives factual in the first 
paragraph and in the second paragraph says 
conflict of what occurred thereafter, which 
infers that there was no conflict in respect 
to what occurred before. 
Once again, the plaintiff is not suing on the 
amendment, it misstates the law regarding a 
proposed amendment. The evidence is that the 
amendment was proposed and even considering 
11 
the defendants version but no evidence of 
plaintiff's performance — that plaintiff's 
performance was conditional. By that, your 
Honor/ there's no evidence, and never been any, 
no statement and is unclear from the instruction 
that plaintiff's proposal of the amendment was 
unconditional. 
In other words, it was not conditioned on their 
acceptance. The evidence is to the contrary, 
his evidence showed, as did the evidence of 
defendant's witnesses, that he continued to 
perform." 
As to instruction 14, plaintiff's objection is found at 
page 437, line 12, which follows: 
"I object to instruction no. 14 on the following 
grounds. This is an abstract statement of law and 
therefore its misleading. Its not shown how the 
law stated is applied to the facts, and I accept 
the ruling on same grounds as stated in the 
objection." 
His objections to instruction no. 15 were as follows: 
at page 438, line 15 through 23: 
"1. Number One, if contentions of the parties are 
to be stated they must be stated in respect of what 
was in the pleadings and not what was in the 
evidence. They are misleading, confusing in 
syntax, given factual in the — no not that part. 
We are not suing on the amendment. It refers to 
an addendum and should refer to an amend-
ment, and I indicated to Mr. McCoy that 
I — every time we have met I said, "you keep 
talking about an addendum and it was an 
amendment"." 
It is submitted that the appeal of theplaintiff 
herein is not based upon any of the foregoing objections to the 
instructions. Objections to instructions cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal, Cooper v. dinger's Inc., 387 P2d 685, 15 
12 
UT 2d 85 (1963). In any event, the objection that the 
instructions must only state contentions alleged in the pleadings 
was not well taken. Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P2d 372 (UT 1983). 
The argument of the plaintiff that the proposed 
amendment did not give the defendants the right not to perform 
on the underlying contract because the proposed amendment was not 
accompanied by plaintiff's unconditional refusal to perform 
simply is plaintiff's theory of his case. Plaintiff failed to 
submit any such instruction to the Court. The plaintiff cannot 
object to an instruction given based upon defendant's theory of 
the case on the ground that the instructions does not express 
plaintiff's theory where plaintiff failed to submit any 
instructions setting forth his theory of the case. 
Further, the only case cited in the brief does not deal 
with a fact situation or legal principles in any way related to 
the instant case, but deals with assignment, duty to pay for 
materials and other matters. 
In the appeal, the plaintiff makes no contention that 
the interrogatories answered by the jury were improper or that 
the answers to those interrogatories by the jury were not based 
upon substantial evidence. It is obvious from a reading of the 
record that the findings of the jury were based upon substantial 
evidence including testimony of the plaintiff. Thus it is 
apparent that the plaintiff had no legal or factual basis upon 
13 
which t o make t h i s a p p e a l t h u s e n t i t l i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t s h e r e i n t o 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s p u r s u a n t t o t h e r u l e s of t h e Utah C o u r t of 
A p p e a l s , 3 3 ( a ) . See O ' B r i e n v^ Rush , 744 P2d 306 (UT. C t . of 
App. 1987) and Brown v . H a r r y H g a t h m a n , 744 P2d 1 0 1 6 , 69 Utah 
Adv. R p t s . 36 ( C o u r t of A p p e a l s 10 29 8 7 ) . 
CONCLUSION 
A p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f does no t c i t e pages in t h e r e c o r d t o 
show any p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r by t h e t r i a l C o u r t and a v o i d s t h e 
t e s t i m o n y upon which t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y were f o r m u l a t e d . 
No l e g a l o r f a c t u a l b a s i s i s shown f o r t h i s a p p e a l . The t r i a l 
Cour t judgment of d i s m i s s a l s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d and t h i s m a t t e r 
r e m a n d e d t o t h e t r i a l C o u r t f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a t t o r n e y ' s 
f e e s i n c u r r e d by d e f e n d a n t s on t h i s a p p e a l . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d thi^r?2 6t]i, day of J u l y , 1988 . 
I he reby c e r t i f y t h a t I hand d e l i v e r e d / / s e v e n (7) c o p i e s 
of R e s p o n d e n t ' s B r i e f t o t h e Utah C o u r t of A p p e a l , 400 Mid town 
O f f i c e P l a z a , 230 S. 500 E . , S a l t Lake C i t y ' , U tah 8 4 1 0 2 , and 
had f o u r (4) c o p i e s d e l i v e r e d t o R o y a l t U H u n t , a t t o r n e y f o r 
p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , 1871 W. 7800 S., We^2 J o r d a n , Utah 84084, 
t h i s 2 6 t h day of J u l y , 1 9 8 8 , by U. S. M / ^ I / / ^ 6 s t a g e p r e p a i d . 
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APPENDIX 
- 1 5 -
.'.\r.2Z 19?" 
,n. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD BIRD, DBA, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
DUANE LINFORD, ET AL, 
Defendant 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CIVIL NO. C 85-7922 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: 
-16- *.c\0°€ 
1 verdict in this matter: 
A. Was the addendum attached to the contract upon the 
date when the contract was in fact signed by: 
1. The Plaintiff Yes/__/ No/ / 
2. The Defendant Yes/ / No/^V 
B. If you answered "yes" to A. 2. above, 
then answer the following questions. 
1. Did the defendant, Stanley Varner, know 
that the addendum was attached to the contract at 
the time that he signed it? 
Yes/ / No/ / 
2. Did the defendant, Stanley Varner, agree 
to the terms upon the addendum? 
Yes/ / No/ / 
Has plaintiff shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he made a clear, positive and 
unambiguous acceptance of the contract 
prepared by the defendant herein marked 
Exhibitl2-D. Yes / / No /J±/ 
Did the plaintiff attempt to change, add to 
or qualify the terms of the original contract 





E. If you answered "yes" to C and D above, has plaintiff 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendants made a clear, positive and 
unambiguous acceptance of the contract form 
together with the changes in terms referred 
to in Exhibit 10-D. Yes / / No / / 
F. If you answered "yes" to E above, then answer: 
Did the defendant, Goldstone Investment, by statements 
and conduct of its general partner defendant, Stan 
Varner, thereafter communicate unequivocally to plaintiff 
the intention of Goldstone Investment not to allow 
defendant to do work for plaintiff in the future? 
Yes / / No / / 
If you answered "no" to E above, you are to skip 
G as follows: 
G. If and only if you answered yes to E above, 
then fill in the amount of damages, if any which you 
find the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence: 
We find the damages incurred by the plaintiff 
is the sum of $ 
DATED this •^|:; day of August, 1987. 
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